1. Introduction

The topic of this lecture is both huge and challenging. But, it has to be addressed if one wants to discuss the most recent developments in sport in an objective and hence unprejudiced way. Allowing for the lecture’s allotted timeframe, one can introduce and focus on examples, which through analysis can lead to fruitful discussions.

The term “governance” has its etymological roots in, respectively, the Greek and Latin word(s) kyberno and gubernare, meaning “to handle and/or to be responsible for the main rudder of a ship”. Chappelet explains that “governance” is a “seventeenth-century French word designating the territory controlled by a governor”.¹ Today, the term has become popular in almost all areas of life, of which sport is the aspect of interest for us here at the International Olympic Academy (IOA).

In accordance with the aspirations of its founders, Ioannis Ketseas (1887–1965) and Carl Diem (1882–1962), the IOA continues to be a space for authentic learning about Olympism, for which discussions on the ethical values of sport are crucial. Without doubt, defending the Olympic Movement’s belief in its own ethical mission has been challenging; this holds true even all the way back to the first edition of the Modern Olympic Games held in Athens in 1896. Significant issues have surfaced in the areas of, among others, discussions on the amateur status of Olympic athletes, which continually challenged the IOC up to the 1980s, corruption, and doping. The latter is addressed within this article by giving consideration to the analysis of both historical and contemporary IOC policies in relation to anti-doping and, thus, safeguarding the ethical dimension of Olympism. All of these policies can be summarized under the label of “governance”, even though the term was not officially included within the Olympic Charter before the turn of the century.

2. Governance policies and protecting the mission of the Olympic Movement

In 1998, the term “governance” appeared for the first time explicitly in the area of international sport. This debut was a response to the Salt Lake City scandal. Briefly recounting the events that unfolded, it was at the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) Session in 1995 at which the 19th Olympic Winter Games were awarded to the city of Utah. On 24 November 1998, a Salt Lake City TV channel reported that IOC members had been bribed to vote for Salt Lake City. Around 30 IOC members were accused of having accepted from the Salt Lake City 2002 Winter Olympics Bid Committee inter alia money, valuable gifts, payments for medical treatments and luxury holidays.²

It was Marc Hodler (1918—2006), IOC member in Switzerland, IOC Vice-President 1993–1997, long-serving president of the International Ski Federation (FIS), and above all supervisor of the bidding process for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, who publically criticized faults in the bidding process for the Olympic Games. According to him, the problem of bidding cities bribing IOC members had been on the increase since the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. He attributed this to the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee’s development of a new commercial formula to finance the Games from private sponsorship, the result of which had been the generation of a surplus of approximately $ 250 million in 1984. Explicitly, at an IOC press conference on 8 December 1998, Hodler said:

To my knowledge, there has always, always, been a certain part of the vote given to corruption [...] It had gone on too long and it had to stop.³

The IOC reacted swiftly and within a few days had established an internal commission, which was chaired by Richard Pound. By the beginning of 1999, the commission was able to present its findings, leading to the expulsion/forced resignation of 10 IOC members and disciplinary action against several others.⁴ In order to avoid a repeat of the regrettable incidents and the further under- mining of the integrity of the Olympic Movement, the IOC appointed the 2000 Commission, which became known as the Reform Commission. The Commission’s overriding task was to examine all the component parts of the Olympic Movement. This led to the formulation of 50 recommendations, all of which were approved at the IOC Session held on 11–12 December 1999. These recommendations were focused on the following areas: the structure and composition of the IOC, the IOC and the Olympic Movement, administrative reforms, the selection process for Olympic Games, and culture and education.⁵

Despite the momentum behind reform, it took another four years for the term “governance” to find its way into the Olympic Charter (Olympic Charter 2004). Published within Article 19.3.2, the reference was made in relation to internal policies: “The IOC Executive Board approves all internal governance regulations relating to its organization”.⁶ However, a more comprehensive usage of “governance” in terms of its meaning and interpretation did not surface until 2011, when it was included in the Olympic Charter’s definition of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism:

5. Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports organisations within the Olympic Movement shall have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied.⁷

In the Fundamental Principles of Olympism, the mission and objectives of the Olympic Movement are explained in a manner which stresses its uniqueness. One area the Fundamentals focus on is the impact the Olympic Movement has on society through its profiling of top-level and leisure sport as an important part of culture and an educational tool for the development of moral and social character traits. The existence of governance policies which aim to apply transparency, integrity, equality, and responsibility to the IOC, its stakeholders, and within processes of exchange between them is a necessity for the realization of these objectives.

The importance of stressing the representation of this objective in the most transparent way possible to the public was mentioned by Thomas Bach in the “Unity in Diversity” speech he delivered at the XIIIth Olympic Congress in Copenhagen in 2009.⁸ Showcasing advancements, Bach referred to the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement and Sports Movement, a document produced by an IOC working group in 2008⁹ which lists the following principles:

1. It is necessary to define the vision and mission of the organization and to develop a strategy to achieve its goals.

2. Clear, democratic and efficient structures must be created, as well as clear and transparent rules for decision-making. This includes rules dealing with members' conflicts of interest.

3. It is vital to establish a clear definition of internal competences, including a system of checks and balances, and to promote democratic decision-making through good internal communication.

4. Internal responsibilities should be defined by means of rules and standards, and accounting and auditing processes should comply with general standards. Moreover, financial processes should be transparent.

5. Clear and transparent rules should be created for the distribution of financial revenues.

6. Sports organizations should involve active athletes in decision-making and protect and promote their rights at all levels.

7. Sports organizations should work in partnership with governments.

The first principle mentioned in the document and analyzed in Bach’s speech at the Olympic Congress in Copenhagen forms the basis for the following six,¹⁰ and will thus constitute a main focus of this article. The principle stresses the importance of developing and sticking to governance policies which protect the mission of the Olympic Movement and safeguard the positive image of Olympic sport in society. Without doubt, this responsibility is not a new challenge but one which has persisted ever since the first edition of the Olympic Games was celebrated in Athens in 1896. In an attempt to explain this, the remainder of the paper sets out to analyze governance policies which the IOC have implemented in the past and are currently targeting in the present in regard to the issue of doping and safeguarding the mission of the Olympic Movement as well as its positive societal reception.

3. Basic IOC Governance Policies in Anti-Doping before the Turn of the Century

Perhaps surprisingly, the first instance of doping surfacing in the IOC agenda did not occur with the beginning of the growth of commercialization within the Olympic Movement, which began during the 1980s. Rather, the earliest primary source uncovered to date on the IOC’s involvement in the fight against doping refers to the 35th Session of the IOC, which took place on March 13–18 1935 in Cairo. The official minutes for the session mention the following policy measure stressing the importance of condemning doping and dealing with performance-enhancing drugs:

The use of drugs or artificial stimulants of any kind must be condemned most strongly, and everyone who accepts or offers dope, no matter in what form, should not be allowed to participate in amateur meetings or in the Olympic Games.¹¹

Nevertheless, the introduction of these initial anti-doping policies did not lead to a binding entry in the Olympic Charter itself. While the problem had been raised in the IOC, awareness of the issue was probably not yet fully developed. Indeed, one can interpret the quotation as attributing doping to the area of professionalism, the existence of which in Olympic sport had long been denied overwhelmingly by the IOC.

Further impetus for the IOC to devote itself to the topic of doping was provided by the death of the Danish cyclist, Knud Jensen, at the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome. Jensen collapsed during the 100km team time competition and later died in hospital. The autopsy found that Jensen had consumed Ronicol, a substance which expands the blood vessels.¹²

Based on the discussions that followed this incident, the IOC Executive Board approached the doping problem at its meeting in Athens in 1961 where, on the initiative of the French IOC member, Comte Jean de Beaumont, the setting up of a working group was proposed. This group was established in March 1962 by the IOC in the form of a Medical Sub-Commission chaired by the IOC member Sir Arthur Porritt (New Zealand).¹³

After initial difficulties in the consultations and workings of the Medical Sub-Commission, Porritt was able to present a draft four-point plan at the IOC session in Tokyo in 1964. This included, among other items, a statement condemning the use of drugs (doping), sanction proposals against National Olympic Committees and persons directly and indirectly supporting doping, and suggestions pertaining to the convocation of a medical team to carry out doping tests. However, the implementation of these proposals and the acceptance of the list of prohibited substances submitted by the Medical Sub-Commission were hesitant. Accordingly, the responsibility largely fell to the IOC Medical Commission, founded in 1967, to which the Medical Sub-Commission was transferred. The chairman of the Medical Commission was IOC member Prince Alexandre De Merode (Belgium), and it was on his initiative that doping was defined in the Olympic Charter (1967):¹⁴

The use of drugs or artificial stimulants of any kind is condemned and any person offering or accepting dope, in any form whatsoever, cannot partici- pate in the Olympic Games. Conviction of a competitor for the use of dope shall result in the disqualification of the entire team in that sport.¹⁵

The Medical Commission introduced doping controls for the first time during the Olympic Winter Games in 1968, but athletes were only tested for the prohibited use of alcohol, amphetamines, ephedrine and cannabis. Pilot tests for the detection of anabolic steroids were then carried out at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972; these tests have been officially administered since Montreal 1976.¹⁶ A further significant milestone in doping prevention occurred in the inclusion of the Medical Code in the Olympic Charter in 1975:

A—Doping is forbidden. The IOC will prepare a list of prohibited drugs.

B—All Olympic competitors are liable to medical control and examination, in conformity with the rules of the Medical Commission.

C—Any Olympic competitor refusing to take a doping test or who is found guilty of doping shall be eliminated. [...].

D—Competitors in sport restricted to women must comply with the prescribed test for femininity.

E—A medal may be withdrawn by order of the Executive Board or a proposal from the Medical Commission.

F—A Medical Commission may be set up to implement these rules. Members of this commission may not act as Team Doctors.

G—The above regulations shall in no way affect further sanctions by the International Federations.¹⁷

However, the IOC focused its anti-doping campaigns explicitly and restrictively on the Olympic Games, despite regarding itself and being perceived as the world’s governing body in sport. Through its Medical Commission, the IOC established the list of prohibited substances, accredited anti-doping laboratories, conducted the tests at the Olympic Games, and imposed sanctions for doping offences.¹⁸ These internal policies do not seem to have been entirely successful, however. From the introduction of doping controls at the 1968 Olympic Winter Games in Grenoble to the 1996 Olympic Summer Games in Atlanta, only 53 athletes tested positive, although the following factors also need to be taken into account: there were no positive doping tests at the 1980 Olympics in Moscow; nine positive doping tests disappeared at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics; and a lack of documentation on numerous positive samples was deplored at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta.¹⁹

By the end of the 1990s, the IOC seemed to be satisfied with its response to doping. The lack of positive doping samples meant that the integrity of Olympic sport could be demonstrated, while the positive testing of a few individual athletes, including top stars like Ben Johnson, allowed the IOC to emphasize that the applied policies were effective.

There was little interest within the IOC in building an effective anti-doping campaign that extended beyond Olympic sport. Even towards the International Sports Federations (IFs), which are represented in the Olympic programme, a laissez-faire attitude prevailed. That the IFs were only obligated to sign the Medical Code, whose scope was limited solely to the Olympic Games would indicate that the IOC did not see itself as responsible for the issue of doping in competitions outside the Olympics, considering this a matter for the IFs. This attitude is exemplified by the reaction of Francois Carrad, the former Director General of the IOC, to the doping scandal at the 1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima. During the competition, seven swimmers tested positive, and even before the Games, the Chinese swimmer and world 400m freestyle champion, Yang Aihua, was found to have doped. Although Aihua’s testosterone parameter was three times higher than the allowed threshold,²⁰ Carrad’s only intervention in the debacle was to state that “The IOC sees no reason to comment on a procedure for which FINA is responsible”!²¹

The turning point in the IOC’s anti-doping policy was brought about by the Festina scandal that hit the 1998 Tour de France. The fatality in question demonstrated just how out of hand doping had got and forced the world to take notice of the inefficiency of the control system then in place. The main thrust of the public and political criticism was directed at the IOC, in the light of its self-conception as the world governor of sport. At the World Conference on Doping in Lausanne which the IOC convened in 1999, the invited sports ministers accused the IOC of complacency and accused them of placing economic interests above the credibility of sport.²²

The resulting negative public opinion encouraged the IOC to adopt new antidoping control guidelines and to support the founding of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) as an institution independent of the IOC.²³ Since 2000, the IOC has transferred central areas of responsibility to WADA, namely the updating of the list of prohibited substances and the accreditation of international anti-doping labs. Doping controls at the Olympic Games, however, continue to be carried out under the authority of the IOC in cooperation with the host country’s organizing committee and the National Anti-Doping Agency responsible for the nation in question.

In 2004, the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) was adopted. The WADC now provides the overriding guidelines for all sports actors involved in anti-doping, both Olympic and non-Olympic. That the IOC has replaced the Medical Code with the WADC in the Olympic Charter²⁴ demonstrates its assumption of responsibility for the anti-doping battle in its full international character. The clearest example of this assumption of responsibility is the IOC’s insistence that the IFs sign the WADC of the WADA as a condition for their inclusion in the Olympic sports programme.²⁵

By supporting the reorientation of the international anti-doping campaign, the IOC was able to re-establish the credibility of the Olympic Movement and its basic principles and to regain the public’s lost faith. While these measures did not totally convince the public, the criticism the IOC received was limited in so far as its responsibility as the world governor of sport was no longer called into question. Undoubtedly, the statistics documenting the increase in IOC activity in relation to the conducting of doping controls at the Olympic Games, establishing WADA and adopting the WADC were significant aspects of this endeavour:

Test results at the Olympic Summer Games: 1996–2012 ²⁶

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4. New challenges for IOC governance policies in anti-doping

In the years following the founding of WADA and the adoption of the WADC, the IOC expanded its political, financial and educational initiatives to support the international anti-doping struggle. In regard to the latter, it is interesting to note that Porritt, who we introduced above as chair of the Medical Sub-Commission, already wanted to link the anti-doping campaign with education in 1964, calling for “a long-term education policy stressing the physical and moral aspects of the drug problem”²⁷. Without doubt, the IOC has since developed educational initiatives in terms of anti-doping, especially in the period after 2000. One could refer inter alia to the strengthening of their athlete dual career programmes, or to the implementation of the IOC’s Entourage Commission as specific examples.²⁸ Of course, these and other anti-doping policies have made their way into Olympic Agenda 2020, which was adopted in December 2014.²⁹ In terms of justifying the necessity of these activities, one need only consider the recent doping scandals made public by the Russian whistle-blowers, Yulia Stepanova and Vitaly Stepanova. Since ARD (the public German TV channel) aired the Stepanovas’ story in December 2014, the athlete couple have increasingly questioned the integrity of Olympic sport.

In accordance with Recommendation 15 of Olympic Agenda 2020, the IOC commissioned re-tests of the doping samples from the London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games in the lead-up to the Rio de Janeiro Summer Games. As a direct consequence 41 athletes were not given permission to participate due to positive test results. The total number of positive doping samples increased further as the IOC went on with the re-testing even after the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. As of 5 April 2017, 1, 545 samples have been selected for re-analysis of which 109 have tested positive. In all, 41 athletes were excluded from the Rio 2016 Games on the basis of these tests. The positive findings are displayed by sport in the following table:

Positive samples in the re-testing of samples from Beijing 2008 and London 2012.³⁰

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One can argue that the IOC’s decision to start re-testing samples forced them to reveal their position on doping. The rationale for this can be made on the grounds that the multitude of positive samples left them with little choice but to recognize the fundamental inter-institutional weaknesses of the extant anti-doping initiatives. Of course, this has had a negative impact on the safeguarding of the mission and vision of the Olympic Movement, which clearly depends on sporting integrity. In order to deal with this problem, decisions and action guidelines have subsequently been developed. These have mainly been exchanged between the IOC and WADA and have proved controversial. Three examples from this discussion are as follows:

1. On 24 July 2016, the IOC decided against a complete ban of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) from the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro and thus disregarded the recommendation made by WADA.³¹ An important consideration in the IOC’s decision was the lack of the then still pending final evaluation of the McLaren report on the state-orchestrated doping strategies used in Russia at the London 2012 Olympic Games, the 2013 World Athletics Championships in Moscow, and the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympic Games. The IOC made the IFs responsible for deciding which Russian athletes should be banned from the 2016 Olympic Games for their respective sports. However, some guidelines on which the decisions could be based were provided to the IFs by the IOC. The IOC’s decision was negatively perceived by the public, as the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) decided on 7 August 2016 to completely exclude the Russian Paralympic Committee (RPC) from the Rio de Janeiro Paralympics.³²

2. In its Independent Observer Report on the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games, WADA heavily criticized the IOC for the poor organization of doping tests and serious failings in relation to doping during the Games.³³ The IOC defended its role in the anti-doping measures carried out during the time spent in Rio, arguing that WADA was responsible for any shortcomings because it had accredited the Brazilian Anti-Doping Agency (ABCD) which, according to the IOC, had provided challenging working and laboratory conditions.

3. In the problem area of sanctioning authorities, competing proposals have been suggested, discussed, and examined. One consideration proposed by the IOC was to pass the decision-making authority on to WADA or the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).³⁴ In addition, after the 5th Olympic Summit, the IOC put forward the notion of reintroducing the Osaka Rule.³⁵ This was included in the Olympic Charter in 2007 and stipulated that athletes who had been charged with a doping penalty of more than six months were automatically excluded from the next Olympic Games. The rule had been declared invalid by the CAS in 2011.

These controversial discussions on common inter-institutional lines of action have fed the public perception that no clear decisions and policies have been put into place to fight doping.³⁶ This has almost invariably led as a result to the hollowing out of the Vision, Mission and Strategy principle included in the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement and the Sport Movement. As already mentioned, this principle is essentially concerned with the formation of the Olympic Movement’s profile in society.

Upholding its presumed role as the world governing body of sport, the IOC was quick to respond to the public criticism. Based on the discussions at the 5th Olympic Summit held in Lausanne on 8 October 2016, the IOC Executive Board agreed on a declaration that would recommend strengthening its dialogue and collaboration both with WADA and the National Anti-Doping Organizations (NADOs). A meeting of the Executive Committee was held on 16 March 2017 with the final declaration stressing inter alia that:³⁷

1. WADA had to be independent of sport organizations and national interests. Consequently, it was recommended that both the President and Vice-President of WADA should neither be from the government or any sports organization. However, since both fields contain founding stakeholders, it has been argued that both governments and sports organizations must be represented on the WADA Foundation Board and Executive Committee. It was also recommended that both boards include independent members. Guaranteeing the independence of athletes on the Board was seen as vital, and it was proposed that they should therefore be elected rather than appointed.

2. It was recommended that an Independent Testing Authority (ITA) should be established, whose Board should be composed of representatives from public authorities, the Olympic Movement, WADA, and elected athletes. The responsibilities of this new institution were foreseen as the development of an International Test Distribution Plan (ITDP) for each sport and sporting discipline. It was argued that this should be done in collaboration with the respective IF, and it was agreed that the ITDP should specify a minimum number of tests each athlete has to pass in order to remain eligible for World Championships and Olympic Games. The NADOs were made responsible for the execution of these tests on the request of the ITA.

3. With regard to sanctioning authorities, the Executive Board stressed the importance of referring this to the CAS. Arguing in favour of the democratic principle of a “separation of powers”, IOC President Bach stated that the “prosecutor (WADA) should not be the judge”. Discussions on the re-implementation of the Osaka Rule did not resurface and were obviously not on the agenda of the Executive Board Meeting.

The IOC Executive Board’s recommendations on strengthening the global fight against doping clearly stresses the IOC’s interest in, and intent on, tailoring existing governance policies while welcoming the prospect of forming new ones. Its stance seeks to safeguard the mission and vision of the Olympic Movement, whose cornerstone is ethically justifiable sport. Achieving this would not only be beneficial for the IOC itself, but also for all the actors involved in the Olympic Movement on the economic, political, cultural, educational or social level. If sport’s integrity is not to be further undermined, multilateral synergies have to be strengthened between the IOC, WADA, NADOs, governments, IFs, NOCs, sponsors, athletes and coaches. The outcome of such an initiative would help suppress the growing suspicion of sport on the part of the public. However, the complexity involved in accomplishing this must not be underestimated, especially considering that it has become increasingly difficult to re-establish public trust in the inter-institutional policies of sport’s central governing bodies. While previous initiatives such as the IOC Executive Board’s recommendations of 16 March 2017 have been welcomed as signals of a constructive new approach, the optimism diminishes with the revelation of new problem areas. The most recent example of this was the decision taken by the IOC and WADA not to follow up on the sanctioning of samples from the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games which tested positive for Clenbuterol.³⁸ One can discuss this decision and find some justification for it, but its announcement just a few weeks after the promising meeting of the IOC Executive Board in PyeongChang indubitably planted new doubts in the public’s perceptions. Hence, the public’s perception of the integrity of Olympic sport and the policies which govern it can only be stabilized if transparency is given top priority in all decision-making processes.

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1. J. L. Chappelet: Autonomy and governance. Necessary bedfellows in the fight against corruption in sport. In: G. Sweeney & K. McCarthy (eds.): Transparency International: Global Corruption Report: Sport. Abingdon 2016, 16.

2. Chappelet 2016, 21.

3. B. Kidd & H. Dichter: Introduction. In: H. Dichter & B. Kidd (eds.): Olympic Reform Ten Years Later. Abingdon 2012, 1.

4. St. Wenn, R. Barney & S. Martyn: Tarnished Rings. The International Olympic Committee and the Salt Lake City City Scandal. Syracuse, New York 2011.

5. J. J. MacAloon: Scandal and governance: inside and outside the IOC 2000 Commission. In: Dichter & Kidd 2012, 4-20.

6. IOC: Olympic Charter 2004, 45.

7. IOC: Olympic Charter 2011, 10.

8. T. Bach: Unity in Diversity – Respect, Responsibility, Reliability. XIIIth Olympic Congress, Copenhagen 2009, 108–111. https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/ OlympicOrg/IOC/Congresses/XIII-Olympic-Congress-Copenhagen-2009/Overview/ EN-XIII-Olympic-Congress-Proceedings.pdf#_ga=1.84802331.389678917.1394015585 (accessed 7 February 2017), 110.

9. IOC: Preliminary Document. Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement 2008. https://stillmed.olympic.org/AssetsDocs/importednews/documents/en_report_1292.pdf (accessed 1 February 2017). 2.

10. The main arguments in this speech on the importance of governance policies for strengthening the mission of the Olympic Movement were used in Bach's successful presidential campaign and were thus considered in the development of Olympic Agenda 2002, with 40 recommendations approved at the IOC Session in Monaco in December 2014.

11. IOC: Minutes of the 35th IOC Session, Cairo 13–18 March 1938, 30.

12. S. Wassong: ‘Clean Sport’: A Twofold Challenge in the Contemporary History of the Modern Olympic Movement. In: R. Barney, M. Heine, K. Wamsley & G. MacDonald (eds.): Pathways: Critiques and Discourses in Olympic Research. Ninth International Symposium for Olympic Research. London, Ontario 2008, 88.

13. J. Krieger & S. Wassong: Die institutionelle Formierungsphase und das förhe Wirken der Medizinischen Kommission des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees. In: E. Meinberg & S. Körner: Doping kulturwissenschaftlich betrachtet. Sankt Augustin 2013, 105.

14. Krieger & Wassong 2013, 106–107.

15. IOC: Olympic Charter 1967. https://www.olympic.org/olympic-studies-centre/collections/ official-publications/olympic-charters (accessed 8 February 2017), 46.

16. B. Houlihan: Doping in Sport. More Problems than Solutions. In: B. Houlihan (ed.): Sport & Society. London 2003, 225.

17. IOC: Olympic Charter 1975. https://www.olympic.org/olympic-studies-centre/collections/ official-publications/olympic-charters (accessed 8 February 2017 Zugriff), 17–18.

18. J. Krieger: Dope Hunters. The Influence of Scientists on the Global Fight against Doping in Sport, 1967-1992. Champaign 2016, 49.

19. J. Krieger: Intended. Underrated. Disputed. The IOC Medical Commission’s Subcommission on Doping and Biochemistry in Sport between 1980 and 1988. In: Performance Enhancement & Health 4(2016), 92.

20. J. Todd & T. Todd: Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement: 1960–1999. In: W. Wayne & E. Derse (eds.): Doping in Elite Sport. The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement. Champaign 2001, 102.

21. Carrad quoted in J. Hoberman: How Drug Testing Fails: The Politics of Doping Control. In: Wilson & Derse 2001, 248.

22. Wassong 2008, 89-90.

23. Houlihan 2003, 230.

24. IOC: Olympic Charter 2004. https://www.olympic.org/olympic-studies-centre/collections/ official-publications/olympic-charters (accessed 8 February 2017), 82.

25. Wassong 2008, 91.

26. P. Hemmersbach: History of mass spectrometry at the Olympic Games. In: Journal of Mass Spectrometry (2008) 34. 839–853.

27. Wassong 2008, 88.

28. C. Bertling & S. Wassong: Striving for Athletic Excellence: A Core Value and Challenge for the Profile of the Ancient and Modern Olympic Games. In: The International Journal of the History of Sport 33(2016)4, 445.

29. Please refer to Recommendations 14–18 of Olympic Agenda 2020.

30. IOC: IOC reanalysis programme Beijing 2008 and London 2012. https://stillmed.olympic. org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-Are/Commissions/Disciplinary-Commission/IOC-reanalysis-programme-5-April-2017-eng.pdf (accessed 6 April 2017).

31. IOC: Decision of the IOC Executive Board concerning the participation of Russian athletes in the Olympic Games Rio 2016 from 24 July 2016. https://www.olympic.org/news/statement-of-the-IOC-executive-board-concerning-the-participation-of-russian-athletes-in-the-olympic-games-rio-2016 (accessed 27 December 2016).

32. IPC: The IPC decision on the membership status of the Russian Paralympic Committee from 7 August 2016. https://www.paralympic.org/news/ipc-suspends-russian-paralympic-committee-immediate-effect (accessed 28 December 2016).

33. N. Butler: WADA Independent Observers report blasts role of Rio 2016 in Games-time anti-doping programme. http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1043096 (accessed 3rd November, 2017).

34. IOC: Pressemitteilung vom 8.Oktober 2016. https://www.olympic.org/news/declaration-of-the-5th-olympic-summit (Zugriff 18.11.2016).

35. L. Morgan: IOC propose reintroducing controversial Osaka Rule to keep drug cheats out of Olympics. http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1043920/ioc (accessed 22th November 2016).

36. On the discussions refer, amongst others, to: M. Pavitt: “Troubling omissions” overshadow Olympic Summit, iNADO claim. http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1042474/ (Accessed 18 October 2016). M. Pavitt: Exclusive: Olympic Summit “short on specifics” claims Pound. http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1042515/ (Accessed 19 October 2016). N. Butler: Exclusive: Tygart warns IOC that they must restore confidence in anti-doping system http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1042350/ (Accessed 7 October 2016). N. Butler: IOC vice-president prepared for “tough battle” with WADA to reform anti-doping system. http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1042237/ (Accessed 17 November 2016).

37. IOC: Declaration of the IOC Executive Board. 12 principles for a more robust and independent global Anti-Doping System to protect clean athletes. PyeongChang 16 March 2017. https:// www.olympic.org/news/declaration-of-the-ioc-executive-board-1.(Accessed 18 March, 2017).

38. L. Morgan: IOC claim Jamaican sprinters not investigated at Beijing 2008 because traces of Clenbuterol too small. http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1048835/ (Accessed 7 April 2017).

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Wassong Stephan,"Ethics and Governance in the Olympic Movement", in:K. Georgiadis(ed.), Ethics,Education and Governance inthe Olympic Movement, 57th International Session for Young Participants(Ancient Olympia,17/6-1/7/2017), International Olympic Academy, Athens,2018, pp.80-97.

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